11 nominees · 5 ballot items.
Elect 11 directors; ratify Ernst & Young LLP as auditor; advisory approval of named executive officer compensation (say-on-pay); approve the 2026 Stock and Option Plan; and vote on a shareholder proposal to permit shareholder written consents.
Elect eleven director nominees to the board of directors to serve for a one-year term until the 2027 annual meeting.
Ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Vertex’s independent registered public accounting firm for 2026.
Non-binding, advisory vote to approve the compensation of Vertex’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement (say-on-pay).
This non-binding advisory proposal asks shareholders to approve the company’s executive compensation disclosures and overall pay program as described in the proxy statement. Management seeks shareholder endorsement to validate its pay-for-performance design, which emphasizes a heavy weighting of performance-based equity (PSUs) and a mix of short-term cash and long-term equity tied to revenue, pipeline, and manufacturing milestones. The company reports a high degree of shareholder outreach and that its 2025 say-on-pay received approximately 92% support, which management cites as evidence of alignment. The MDCC and board describe clear performance metrics (one-year financial PSUs tied to net product revenue and multi-year non-financial PSUs tied to clinical/regulatory/manufacturing milestones) and discretionary performance adjustments, and they defend individual award sizing relative to peers and retention objectives. Approval would signal continued shareholder support for the compensation philosophy that links a majority of pay to multi-year performance and retention through time-based RSUs. The board recommends a FOR vote on the basis that the program has delivered strong commercial execution, pipeline progress and financial results in 2025, and that its governance features (clawback, no repricing without shareholder approval, stock ownership guidelines, independent MDCC, and robust shareholder engagement) mitigate governance and pay-for-performance risks. Investors should weigh the program’s heavy reliance on equity and formulaic PSUs (with potential upward payouts when performance exceeds targets) against the firm’s recent operational achievements and strategic investments. While advisory, a strong vote in favor would endorse management’s approach and could reduce the likelihood of future pay-related shareholder activism; a weak vote would likely lead the MDCC to engage and potentially revise program elements in response.
Approve the 2026 Stock and Option Plan, which will replace the 2013 Plan and provide shares and award authority for equity compensation.
This management proposal seeks shareholder approval of a new 2026 Stock and Option Plan to replace the 2013 Plan and to continue Vertex’s broad-based equity compensation practices to attract and retain talent. The request is framed around the company’s need to grant equity to a growing employee base and to maintain competitiveness with biotech and broader life-science peers; the board considered historical burn rates, grants and the declining number of shares granted from 2022–2025. Key plan features that bear on investor assessment include a 6.4 million share base plus carryover/fungible shares from the 2013 Plan (with full disclosure of outstanding options, RSUs and PSUs), a fungible share conversion whereby full-value awards count at 1.66 shares per share against the pool, explicit prohibitions on option repricing or exchanges without shareholder approval, no liberal share recycling (shares withheld for taxes or exercise reduce the pool), no reload awards, and limits on dividends on unvested awards. The plan includes a $1.25 million annual limit on aggregate compensation to non-employee directors, broad administrator discretion (the MDCC), and double-trigger change-of-control protections aligned with market practice. Management argues that the award authority is necessary to preserve its equity program while managing dilution and that the plan’s corporate governance features and limits mitigate shareholder dilution and governance risk. Investors should analyze the proposed share pool relative to historical burn, the fungible conversion that increases the effective dilution for full-value awards, the impact on long-term dilution metrics, and the mix of award types (PSUs vs RSUs) which drives incentive alignment. Approval would allow the company to continue its performance-linked equity grants, while rejection would constrain equity-driven retention and could push management to seek alternative (likely cash) compensation or curtail hiring and retention strategies; consequently, the board recommends a FOR vote.
Shareholder proposal requesting that the board permit shareholders entitled to cast the minimum number of votes necessary to authorize action at a fully attended meeting to act by written consent without unnecessary ownership-duration or holding-method restrictions.
The proponent (John Chevedden) asks the board to permit shareholders to act by written consent by the minimum vote necessary to authorize action at a fully attended meeting, removing ownership-duration or holding-method restrictions; the requested change would allow shareholders to initiate any topic via written consent and is motivated by the proponent’s view that special meeting thresholds and the cadence of annual meetings make timely shareholder action difficult. The proponent frames the request as a tool that provides shareholders a faster means to address performance problems and cites several 2025 program setbacks, pipeline discontinuations, and stock price drops to argue urgency. Management opposes, arguing written consent would permit a small group to effect major corporate actions without the transparency and procedural protections of a meeting, and that Vertex already lowered its special meeting threshold from 40% to 25% and engages extensively with holders (representing ~70% of shares) so the change is unnecessary and risks disenfranchisement and abuse. Company context includes recent R&D setbacks highlighted by the proponent, a board policy that favors special meetings and robust shareholder outreach, and governance features such as proxy access and annual director elections that the board cites as stronger protections. The key trade-offs for investors are between enhanced tactical shareholder tools for rapid intervention and the potential governance risks of enabling actions outside the formal, broadly-disclosed meeting process; written consent rights can be useful to minority activists but also may be used opportunistically. Given the board’s existing special meeting threshold change and stated shareholder engagement practices, investors should weigh the marginal benefit of adding written consent against the risk of reduced transparency and potential for a small coalition to act without broad shareholder participation. The proposal is a classic governance vs. shareholder empowerment debate in the context of an active R&D biotech where program outcomes materially affect valuation and where governance mechanisms influence activist pathways.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Capital World Investors | 10.00% | 25,368,124 | $11.3B |
| 2 | Capital Research Global Investors | 8.32% | 21,125,964 | $9.4B |
| 3 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 6.51% | 16,512,810 | $7.4B |
| 4 | STATE STREET CORP | 4.62% | 11,730,139 | $5.2B |
| 5 | BlackRock, Inc. | 3.76% | 9,531,656 | $4.3B |
| 6 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.16% | 5,475,267 | $2.4B |
| 7 | GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 2.10% | 5,339,877 | $2.4B |
| 8 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 2.03% | 5,145,609 | $2.3B |
| 9 | Capital International Investors | 2.02% | 5,126,077 | $2.3B |
| 10 | ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN L.P. | 1.54% | 3,910,786 | $1.8B |
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