11 nominees · 4 ballot items.
Four items: election of 11 directors nominated by the Board; ratification of Ernst & Young LLP as independent registered public accounting firm for 2026; advisory (non-binding) approval of executive compensation (‘say-on-pay’); and a stockholder proposal requesting that directors who fail to obtain a majority vote in an uncontested election leave the Board within nine months.
Elect 11 nominees to the Board of Directors to hold office until the next annual meeting and until their successors are elected and qualified.
Ratify the Audit Committee’s appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2026.
An advisory (non-binding) vote to approve the compensation of the Company’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement (the Company’s annual 'say-on-pay' vote).
This management proposal asks stockholders to cast an advisory vote approving the Company’s executive compensation program as disclosed in the proxy statement. Management seeks this non-binding endorsement to reaffirm alignment between pay and performance, demonstrating that compensation design—mix of base, annual incentives, and performance-based long-term equity—reflects the Company’s strategic objectives. The Company emphasizes a heavy weighting of variable, performance-based pay (e.g., AICP and PRSUs) tied to financial metrics such as adjusted EBITDA, revenue, ROIC and economic profit, and to strategic factors including environment, customer experience, and human capital. The Compensation Committee uses an independent consultant and a peer-group benchmarking process to set target opportunity levels and mix, and has implemented stock ownership guidelines, clawback policies, anti-hedging/pledging restrictions, and compensation risk reviews as governance mitigants. In 2025 the Board reports AICP funding at 92.3% of target and LTIP PRSUs earned at 109.5% of target, illustrating how the program translates company performance into payouts; prior year stockholder support was strong (95% approval in 2025). Management emphasizes that the advisory vote is part of ongoing investor engagement and that the Board will consider results in setting future pay policies, while retaining discretion to design compensation it believes best serves long-term shareholder interests. The Board recommends a vote FOR because it believes the program appropriately balances incentives, risk mitigation, and alignment with stockholders, and has resulted in strong operational and financial performance and returning capital to shareholders.
A shareholder proposal requesting the Board adopt a policy ensuring that any director who fails to receive a majority vote in an uncontested election must leave the Board as soon as possible and no later than nine months after the failed election.
The proponent (John Chevedden) urges the Board to adopt a strict rule requiring any director who fails to receive a majority vote in an uncontested election to leave the Board within nine months, arguing that shareholder votes should be respected, that a short deadline incentivizes director performance, and that it facilitates prompt board refreshment. The requested change is binary and prescriptive: it removes Board discretion and mandates removal even where the Board might identify exceptional circumstances or regulatory or operational reasons to retain the director temporarily. Management’s counterargument emphasizes that United Rentals already has a mandatory-resignation process embedded in its Corporate Governance Guidelines requiring the director to tender a resignation and directing the Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee to consider it and recommend action to the Board—typically within 90 days—together with public disclosure of the Board’s rationale; the Board contends this process balances accountability with flexibility. Company-specific context includes the Board’s view that rigid removal mechanics could be disruptive or create regulatory compliance risks, and the fact that a nearly identical proposal was overwhelmingly rejected by shareholders in 2024, which the Board cites as evidence of investor preference for the existing process. Evaluating the merits requires weighing shareholders’ desire for clear, enforceable accountability mechanisms against the Board’s need for a deliberative process that can consider tenure, qualifications, timing of vacancies, succession planning, and potential short-term harms from forced departures. For an analyst assessing governance risk, the key facts are the existing 90-day resignation consideration framework, the Board’s commitment to public disclosure of its decision and rationale, the previous shareholder vote results, and the trade-off between binding rules and governance flexibility. On balance, the controversy centers on whether predictability and immediate enforcement of shareholder will outweigh the Board’s arguments about preserving latitude to act in the corporation’s best interests in particular cases.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 6.54% | 4,094,282 | $3.0B |
| 2 | STATE STREET CORP | 4.73% | 2,961,599 | $2.2B |
| 3 | Capital Research Global Investors | 4.35% | 2,725,460 | $2.0B |
| 4 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.28% | 2,681,714 | $2.0B |
| 5 | Capital World Investors | 3.51% | 2,201,654 | $1.6B |
| 6 | BlackRock, Inc. | 3.25% | 2,036,533 | $1.5B |
| 7 | JPMORGAN CHASE CO | 3.10% | 1,939,566 | $1.4B |
| 8 | GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 2.34% | 1,466,286 | $1.1B |
| 9 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.06% | 1,293,642 | $942M |
| 10 | ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN L.P. | 1.80% | 1,129,724 | $914M |
The opinions and information contained herein have been obtained or derived from sources believed to be reliable, but Boardroom Alpha cannot guarantee its accuracy and completeness, and that of the opinions based thereon.
This report contains opinions and is provided for informational purposes only – it does not constitute investment, legal or tax advice. You should not rely solely upon the research herein for purposes of transacting securities or other investments, and you are encouraged to conduct your own research and due diligence, and to seek the advice of a qualified securities professional before you make any investment.
None of the information contained in this report constitutes, or is intended to constitute a recommendation by Boardroom Alpha of any particular security or trading strategy or a determination by Boardroom Alpha that any security or trading strategy is suitable for any specific person. To the extent any of the information contained herein may be deemed to be investment advice, such information is impersonal and not tailored to the investment needs of any specific person.
No representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made on behalf of Boardroom Alpha as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein. Boardroom Alpha does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage suffered by any person as a result of relying on all or any part of this research and any liability is expressly disclaimed.