8 nominees · 4 ballot items.
Elect eight directors; advisory approval of executive compensation (say-on-pay); ratify Ernst & Young LLP as independent auditors for fiscal year 2026; and consider a shareholder proposal requesting annual disclosure of corporate political spending and policies.
Elect eight directors (Glenn A. Carter; Margot L. Carter; Brenda A. Cline; Ronnie D. Hawkins, Jr.; Cecil W. Jones; H. Lynn Moore, Jr.; Daniel M. Pope; and Andrew D. Teed) to serve until the next annual meeting.
Non-binding, advisory (say-on-pay) vote to approve the compensation of the Company’s Named Executive Officers as disclosed in the proxy statement.
This management proposal asks shareholders to cast a non-binding advisory vote approving the Company’s executive compensation (the say-on-pay vote) as disclosed in the proxy. Management seeks this advisory approval to confirm that its compensation philosophy—designed to attract, retain, and motivate named executive officers through a mix of service- and performance-based pay—has shareholder support. The proxy highlights that a large majority of NEO pay is at risk (roughly 80% performance-based for the CEO and similar levels for other NEOs), and describes specific short-term and long-term performance metrics (non-GAAP EPS, three-year cumulative recurring revenue growth, and three-year operating margin) that determine vesting for incentive awards. The vote is advisory only and not binding on the Board, but the Compensation Committee (comprised solely of independent directors) will take the outcome into account when setting future compensation. Management recommends a FOR vote, arguing the program aligns executive incentives with long-term shareholder value, incorporates clawback/recovery provisions, and follows market practices and peer benchmarking. Historical context in the proxy shows high prior shareholder support for the Company’s pay practices, which the Board cites as validation of their approach. A sophisticated evaluation should weigh the strength of the performance metrics and governance features (clawbacks, stock ownership guidelines, anti-hedging policy, and independent Compensation Committee oversight) against potential dilution, the calibration of targets, and how well disclosed non-GAAP adjustments and metrics map to realized shareholder returns. The proposal therefore represents a routine governance check on pay alignment and investor sentiment rather than a binding change to compensation arrangements.
Ratify the selection of Ernst & Young LLP as Tyler’s independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2026.
Shareholder proposal (proponent John Chevedden) requests an annual report disclosing policies/procedures and monetary and non-monetary corporate contributions/expenditures related to political campaign intervention and efforts to influence public elections, including recipient identities and amounts.
This shareholder proposal, submitted by John Chevedden, requests an annual, public report disclosing Tyler’s policies and procedures regarding corporate political contributions and a detailed accounting of monetary and non-monetary contributions and expenditures (including recipient identities and amounts) used to influence elections or support candidates. The proponent argues such disclosure protects the Company’s reputation and shareholder value, highlighting risks from contributions routed through trade associations, Super PACs, 527 committees, and 501(c)(4) organizations and citing low scores on political disclosure indices as evidence of a transparency gap. Management and the Board oppose the proposal as redundant and unnecessary, citing Tyler’s publicly available Code of Business Conduct and Ethics that explicitly prohibits political contributions and limits payments to government personnel; they argue additional disclosure would be irrelevant, duplicative, unreasonably broad, administratively burdensome, potentially misleading, and could harm competitive positioning or invite pressure from special interest groups. The Board also notes (a) the practical difficulty and cost of tracking and reporting certain downstream expenditures by trade associations or charities over which the Company has no control, and (b) prior shareholder voting results (approximately 74% opposed in 2025) as an indication of limited shareholder appetite for the requested disclosure. In evaluating the merits, a sophisticated analyst should weigh the proponent’s transparency and reputational risk arguments against management’s contention that the Company already maintains a clear, publicly-disclosed prohibitory policy and that the proposal’s scope could sweep in immaterial or unrelated payments, generating misleading or noisy data. Consideration should also include the potential signaling effect to stakeholders, industry comparators who have adopted similar disclosures, and the likelihood that additional disclosure would change governance outcomes versus merely increasing reporting burdens. Overall, the proposal seeks increased transparency on a politically sensitive area but is contested by the Company on grounds of redundancy, breadth, cost, and potential unintended consequences.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 6.6% | 2,790,428 | $955M |
| 2 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 5.7% | 2,407,398 | $824M |
| 3 | BlackRock, Inc. | 5.3% | 2,244,621 | $769M |
| 4 | T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc. | 4.9% | 2,059,479 | $705M |
| 5 | STATE STREET CORP | 4.6% | 1,935,372 | $663M |
| 6 | PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC | 3.9% | 1,662,188 | $569M |
| 7 | VAN ECK ASSOCIATES CORP | 3.2% | 1,361,084 | $466M |
| 8 | GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 2.7% | 1,130,999 | $388M |
| 9 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.3% | 968,032 | $331M |
| 10 | APG Asset Management N.V. | 2.2% | 939,990 | $279M |
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