3 nominees · 6 ballot items.
Six proposals: (1) election of three Class III directors (George M. Jenkins, Todd C. Davis, John Doux, M.D.); (2) ratification of Ernst & Young LLP as independent auditors for 2026; (3) advisory “say-on-pay” approval of named executive officer compensation; (4) advisory vote on the preferred frequency of future say-on-pay votes (one, two, or three years); (5) approval to amend the 2024 Equity Incentive Plan to increase the share reserve by 750,000 shares; and (6) approval to adjourn the Annual Meeting if there are insufficient votes to approve Proposal 5.
Elect three Class III director nominees (George M. Jenkins, Todd C. Davis, and John Doux, M.D.) to serve three-year terms expiring in 2029.
Ratify the Audit Committee’s appointment of Ernst & Young LLP to serve as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year 2026.
Non-binding advisory vote to approve the compensation paid to the Company’s named executive officers as disclosed in the Proxy Statement (the annual 'say-on-pay' vote).
This advisory proposal asks shareholders to approve, on a non-binding basis, the compensation paid to the Company’s named executive officers as disclosed in the Proxy Statement. Management frames the program as a market-competitive, pay-for-performance arrangement intended to attract, motivate and retain critical executive talent, with a mix of base salary, annual cash bonuses tied to corporate and individual objectives, and equity awards designed to align long-term interests with stockholders. The Compensation Committee and Board emphasize that they will consider the outcome of the advisory vote when setting future executive compensation, though they are not legally bound by the result. In context, Palvella is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company competing for talent in a competitive labor market, and equity awards make up a central part of its compensation philosophy to foster ownership and long-term alignment. Recent say-on-pay results (2025: ~99.1% in favor) indicate strong historical support, which management cites to justify continuity in its approach. Key governance features—such as use of an independent compensation consultant (Aon), clawback policy, and limits on certain awards—are highlighted by management to address potential shareholder concerns about excess risk-taking or poor alignment. Risks to shareholders include potential dilution from equity awards and the tension between generous option grants and capital preservation in a high-burn environment; management argues that awards are broadly distributed to motivate employees and are necessary to retain talent critical for clinical and regulatory milestones. The advisory nature of the vote means stockholder feedback is consultative; however, a negative outcome could prompt significant compensation design changes and more intensive shareholder engagement. Overall, the proposal asks for endorsement of the current disclosure and pay philosophy, and management’s recommendation centers on alignment with performance and retention needs.
Non-binding advisory vote to indicate whether shareholders prefer future say-on-pay votes every one, two, or three years (Board recommends one year).
This advisory proposal asks shareholders to indicate whether they prefer future say-on-pay votes on executive compensation annually, biennially, or triennially; management recommends an annual vote. The Board argues that an annual frequency provides the most timely and actionable feedback loop between shareholders and the Compensation Committee, allowing rapid adjustments to compensation design in response to performance and governance expectations. Because the vote is non-binding, the Board retains discretion but will weigh the outcome when setting policy. The historical context includes the Company’s prior annual say-on-pay and a near-unanimous shareholder approval in 2025, which management views as support for continuing annual votes. For shareholders, a one-year frequency increases opportunities to influence pay policy but can create administrative burdens and short-termism concerns; longer frequencies reduce administrative costs but limit responsiveness. The Board’s recommendation prioritizes regular accountability and alignment with shareholders during a period of operational progress and potential equity dilution management. Institutional investors often prefer annual votes for smaller companies undergoing active development; thus the recommended one-year frequency aligns with that practice. A vote against management’s recommendation would likely trigger further engagement but not an immediate change in policy absent strong opposition.
Approve Amendment No.1 to the 2024 Equity Incentive Plan to increase the share reserve by 750,000 shares to support future equity awards for employees, directors, and consultants.
This management proposal seeks stockholder approval to increase the reserve under the Company’s 2024 Equity Incentive Plan by 750,000 shares to ensure adequate equity is available for grants to employees, directors, and consultants. Management argues that equity awards are essential to recruit, motivate and retain skilled talent in the competitive biopharma sector and that without sufficient authorized shares they would have to rely on cash alternatives that would drain operating cash. The Company describes a broad-based equity program with both new hire and annual awards, and notes that the incremental 750,000 shares are expected to provide roughly one year of grant capacity under current practices, though actual duration depends on pricing, hiring, forfeitures and grant practices. Governance protections highlighted include no evergreen replenishment, prohibition on repricing without stockholder approval, no discounted options, and limits on non-employee director compensation; management also notes the presence of a clawback policy. The Proxy discloses historical burn-rate metrics (2025 burn rate ~10%), outstanding options, and the existing pool and overhang to give context to dilution and expected impact. Key risks for shareholders include further dilution and potential impact on earnings per share, especially given the Company’s active grant pace post-merger; management frames dilution as a necessary trade-off to secure talent to reach clinical and regulatory milestones that create long-term shareholder value. The Board recommends a FOR vote, emphasizing competitive necessity, pay-for-performance alignment, and active monitoring of burn rate and equity usage to manage dilution.
Authorize the meeting chair to adjourn the Annual Meeting to solicit additional proxies if there are insufficient votes to approve Proposal 5 (the 2024 Plan amendment).
This proposal asks shareholders to grant the Board authority to adjourn the Annual Meeting, if necessary, to solicit additional votes to obtain approval of the 2024 Equity Incentive Plan amendment (Proposal 5). Management notes that, if approved, the Company could adjourn without holding a vote on Proposal 5 to continue solicitation efforts and, if adjournment exceeds thirty days, provide notice of the new meeting details. The adjournment authorization also covers successive adjournments to permit continued solicitation until sufficient votes are obtained. The practical effect is to give the Company flexibility to complete a contentious or close vote without re-scheduling a full new meeting, reducing time and expense and allowing management to present additional information or solicit support. For shareholders, the downside is the potential for extended uncertainty and delay in finalizing the approval, but the upside is avoiding the need for a separate meeting if more time will secure approval. The Board recommends approval to preserve the option to continue solicitation efforts and maximize the likelihood of securing necessary approval for the equity plan amendment.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SUVRETTA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 8.04% | 1,153,496 | $144M |
| 2 | First Light Asset Management, LLC | 6.84% | 980,758 | $122M |
| 3 | BVF INC/IL | 6.70% | 960,989 | $120M |
| 4 | Frazier Life Sciences Management, L.P. | 6.15% | 882,400 | $110M |
| 5 | JENNISON ASSOCIATES LLC | 4.13% | 591,898 | $74M |
| 6 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 3.33% | 477,294 | $59M |
| 7 | STATE STREET CORP | 3.20% | 458,999 | $57M |
| 8 | FEDERATED HERMES, INC. | 3.02% | 433,015 | $54M |
| 9 | PRICE T ROWE ASSOCIATES INC /MD/ | 2.73% | 390,942 | $49M |
| 10 | FRONTIER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CO LLC | 2.61% | 374,035 | $47M |
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