7 nominees · 4 ballot items.
Elect seven directors; ratify Ernst & Young LLP as independent auditors; advisory (non-binding) approval of named executive officer compensation (say-on-pay); and approval of the 2026 Equity Incentive Plan.
Elect seven nominees (Chris Diorio, Daniel Gibson, Umesh Padval, Steve Sanghi, Meera Rao, Arthur Valdez, Jr., and Miron Washington) to the board to serve until the 2027 annual meeting.
Ratify the audit and risk committee’s appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as Impinj’s independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2026.
Non-binding, advisory vote to approve the compensation of Impinj’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement.
This advisory proposal asks stockholders to express their approval or disapproval, on a non-binding basis, of the compensation paid to Impinj’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement. Management is seeking this vote to obtain and respond to investor feedback on its executive pay philosophy and practices; the board and compensation committee state they will consider the outcome when making future compensation decisions. The proposal does not change compensation already awarded and is non-binding, but a significant negative vote would trigger engagement and potential changes by the compensation committee. The company describes a compensation program that emphasizes equity-based long-term incentives (RSUs and PSUs tied to relative TSR), annual bonus metrics (revenue and adjusted EBITDA), and governance features such as independent committee oversight, use of an external compensation consultant, clawback policies, minimum vesting requirements, and limits on director awards. Management notes a prior strong say-on-pay result in 2025 (approximately 88% support), and frames continued use of at-risk, performance-based equity as alignment with stockholder interests while retaining talent. Critics of typical say-on-pay structures might focus on realized pay levels, the use and calibration of PSU metrics (relative TSR vs. peers), and severance/change-in-control protections; proxy advisory firms may weigh in based on plan metrics, peer selection, and realized pay outcomes. The compensation committee’s rationale for recommending a FOR vote is that the program aligns pay with performance, uses market data and independent advice, includes clawbacks and ownership guidelines, and responded to stockholder feedback previously. For sophisticated evaluation, important contextual items include the company’s historical say-on-pay support, the use of PSUs measured against the S&P Semiconductor Select Industry Index over multi-year periods, the interaction of equity vesting schedules with retention and change-in-control provisions, and the company’s disclosure of pay-versus-performance metrics and CAP adjustments.
Approve the 2026 Equity Incentive Plan, which would reserve up to 2,000,000 new shares (plus certain returned Prior Plan shares subject to limits) for grants of options, SARs, RSUs, PSUs and other equity awards to employees, directors and consultants.
This management proposal asks stockholders to approve the company’s 2026 Equity Incentive Plan, which would reserve up to 2,000,000 shares (plus certain returned Prior Plan shares subject to a cap) for new equity awards to employees, non-employee directors and consultants. Management seeks approval because the current 2016 Plan is expiring in July 2026 and the company believes continuing to grant equity awards is critical to attract, retain and motivate talent and to align executive and employee incentives with long-term stockholder value. The plan permits a full range of award types (options, SARs, RSUs, PSUs, restricted stock and performance awards) and includes governance-oriented provisions: no evergreen annual share increases; minimum vesting of one year (with a limited 5% exception); no discounted option repricing or exchange program; limits on annual non-employee director compensation; clawback policy application; prohibition on dividends on unvested awards; and administrative discretion by an independent committee. The board and compensation committee considered historical burn rates, forecasted grants, overhang, remaining shares under prior plans, and proxy advisory guidelines in setting the 2,000,000 share request, and project the reserve should cover roughly two to three years of grants under current practices. Material investor concerns to evaluate include the size of the share reserve relative to market practice and the company’s burn rate, the counting and reuse rules for returned shares, the compensation committee’s discretion in selecting recipients and setting performance metrics (particularly for PSUs measured against the S&P Semiconductor Select Industry Index), and the potential dilution impact on existing shareholders. The plan contains anti‑liberalization protections on change-in-control acceleration (no single-trigger for executives), and caps on director awards and aggregate non-employee director cash and equity, which are intended to mitigate governance risks. For an analyst assessing the proposal, key follow-ons would be (i) modeling potential dilution under reasonable grant scenarios and potential overhang trajectories, (ii) reviewing PSU metric design and peer group selection for alignment with long-term value creation, and (iii) assessing the board/committee’s historical use of equity (grant sizes, frequency, and realized pay outcomes) and responsiveness to prior stockholder feedback. The board recommends a FOR vote because the committee believes the plan balances competitive talent needs with governance protections and shareholder-alignment features.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | FMR LLC | 9.88% | 3,010,694 | $309M |
| 2 | BlackRock, Inc. | 9.68% | 2,949,125 | $303M |
| 3 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 7.03% | 2,140,158 | $220M |
| 4 | STATE STREET CORP | 4.87% | 1,484,868 | $152M |
| 5 | Capital International Investors | 4.44% | 1,352,380 | $139M |
| 6 | FMR LLC | 4.17% | 1,269,089 | $130M |
| 7 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.16% | 1,265,710 | $130M |
| 8 | SYLEBRA CAPITAL LLC | 3.72% | 1,132,152 | $116M |
| 9 | Capital World Investors | 3.34% | 1,016,052 | $104M |
| 10 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.77% | 844,319 | $87M |
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