2 nominees · 5 ballot items.
Elect two director nominees; advisory (nonbinding) 'say-on-pay' on executive compensation; approve an increase to the 2011 Equity Incentive Plan by 9,500,000 shares; approve an amendment to the 2000 Employee Stock Purchase Plan to add 750,000 shares and remove the plan termination date; and ratify Ernst & Young LLP as independent auditors for 2026.
Elect Spencer R. Berthelsen and Joan E. Herman as directors for three‑year terms expiring at the 2029 Annual Meeting.
Nonbinding advisory vote to approve the compensation of the named executive officers as disclosed in the Proxy Statement (a 'say-on-pay' vote).
This proposal asks stockholders to cast a nonbinding advisory vote approving the Company’s executive compensation disclosures (the "say-on-pay" vote). Management presents this as an overall endorsement of the named executive officers’ pay as described in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis and the Summary Compensation Table. Ionis frames its program as pay-for-performance with a significant portion of senior executives’ compensation tied to performance (MBO cash bonuses, stock options, and PRSUs), minimum vesting periods, stock ownership guidelines, a clawback policy, and limits on repricing. The Company highlights strong 2025 operating execution — including two independent product launches, revenue and cash performance, and a high Company Performance Factor of 190% — as context for the recommendation. Because the vote is advisory, it does not itself change compensation arrangements, but a substantial negative vote would trigger the Board and Compensation Committee to evaluate stockholder concerns and consider changes. Governance context: Ionis conducts annual say‑on‑pay votes and uses an independent compensation consultant and peer benchmarking; the Board therefore recommends support to affirm its compensation strategy. From a stewardship perspective, investors evaluate this proposal to assess whether the disclosed pay practices meaningfully align with company performance, dilution controls, and long‑term value creation; management highlights recent changes (e.g., increased PRSU weighting, minimum vesting, clawbacks) to strengthen alignment. A vote FOR signals acceptance of the Board’s approach, while a vote AGAINST would indicate significant shareholder concerns that could prompt further dialogue or program changes.
Request to approve amendment to the 2011 Equity Incentive Plan to increase the aggregate share reserve by 9,500,000 shares, raising the total authorized under the plan to 52,000,000 shares.
This proposal asks shareholders to authorize an increase of 9.5 million shares to the Company’s primary equity incentive plan, raising the 2011 Plan reserve to 52 million shares. Management’s stated rationale is operational: with limited remaining shares (approximately 2.6 million as of March 31, 2026) and an ongoing equity budget to support hiring, promotions, and retention, the Company argues it needs the expanded reserve to continue competitive annual grants and to avoid impairing recruiting and retention. The board emphasizes governance protections in the plan — e.g., fungible share counting (1.0 for options, 1.7 for full‑value awards granted after June 2, 2021), no automatic evergreen, limits on repricing or cash‑outs without shareholder approval, minimum vesting rules, and Compensation Committee administration — to mitigate dilution and misuse risk. The Company reports an average annual grant burn below peers (about 2.36% vs. 3.4% peer average) and that the requested increase supports its merit budget and long‑term compensation strategy. Approval requires a majority of votes cast under Nasdaq rules; abstentions and broker non‑votes will not affect the outcome. Key investor considerations include dilution impact versus retention/competition needs, the plan’s anti‑repricing and vesting safeguards, recent grant history and equity burn, and the Compensation Committee’s oversight. If approved, management will have flexibility to continue structured equity grants; if rejected, the Company warns it could harm its ability to recruit and retain talent and execute its commercial and R&D plans.
Request to approve amendment to the 2000 ESPP to increase the share reserve by 750,000 shares and remove the plan termination date (making the plan effectively open‑ended).
This proposal seeks shareholder approval to add 750,000 shares to the ESPP and to remove the plan’s termination date, effectively allowing the ESPP to continue beyond its prior expiration. Management frames the ESPP as a broad‑based tool to attract, retain and reward employees by enabling payroll‑deducted purchases at an 85% discount (based on offering and purchase date pricing), subject to contribution limits and a six‑month holding period. The Company notes only ~130,884 shares remained as of December 31, 2025 and believes that without replenishment the plan may be insufficient to meet recruiting and retention needs before the 2027 annual meeting. Governance safeguards include shareholder approval for material amendments, eligibility limitations (hours and tenure), limits on annual participation per employee, and Section 423 tax‑qualified structure. Investor considerations include modest dilution from the requested shares versus the value of broad employee alignment, the absence of an evergreen provision historically, and the operational importance of the ESPP in retention and ownership culture. Approval requires a majority of votes cast under Nasdaq rules; abstentions and broker non‑votes will not affect the outcome. If approved, the Company retains an active ESPP to support employee ownership; if not approved, the ESPP will face constrained capacity that may pressure recruiting/retention and require other compensation adjustments.
Ratify the Audit Committee’s selection of Ernst & Young LLP as Ionis’ independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year 2026.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Capital World Investors | 12.82% | 21,186,369 | $1.6B |
| 2 | FMR LLC | 8.19% | 13,540,074 | $1.0B |
| 3 | FMR LLC | 6.66% | 11,013,421 | $827M |
| 4 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.73% | 7,808,902 | $586M |
| 5 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.31% | 7,118,330 | $535M |
| 6 | T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc. | 3.73% | 6,159,027 | $462M |
| 7 | WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT GROUP LLP | 3.56% | 5,878,876 | $441M |
| 8 | TWO SIGMA INVESTMENTS, LP | 3.54% | 5,857,629 | $440M |
| 9 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.72% | 4,503,226 | $338M |
| 10 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.57% | 4,251,111 | $319M |
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