5 nominees · 6 ballot items.
Elect five Class III directors; Ratify independent auditor; Advisory vote on executive compensation; Approve amendment to 2024 Stock Option and Incentive Plan; Vote on shareholder proposal to allow 10% holders to call special meetings; Approve adjournment to solicit additional proxies if needed.
Elect five Class III directors (Mike Berry, Claire Hughes Johnson, Yamini Rangan, Clara Shih, Jay Simons) to hold office until the 2027 Annual Meeting.
Ratify PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal year ending December 31, 2026.
Advisory 'say-on-pay' vote to approve the compensation of the company’s named executive officers as disclosed.
Approve Amendment No.1 to the 2024 Plan to add 2,300,000 shares to the plan reserve (increasing to 6,250,000 shares) and related technical amendments.
The proposal asks shareholders to approve Amendment No.1 to the company’s 2024 Stock Option and Incentive Plan to increase the share reserve by 2.3 million shares, expanding the maximum issuable under the Plan to 6,250,000 shares and adjusting related technical limits. Management seeks approval because the current reserve is projected to be exhausted by June 30, 2026 under current grant practices, and they argue that equity is essential to attract and retain AI and technology talent while aligning employee interests with long-term stockholder value. The board frames the requested increase as limited — designed to fund approximately one year of grants under current plans — and emphasizes governance safeguards such as no evergreen provision, double-trigger change-in-control vesting, no repricing without stockholder approval, and recycling of forfeited full-value shares (with exceptions for option-related shares). The Compensation Committee justifies the increase by citing historical burn rates, projected hiring and refresh needs, and the competitive market for talent; they also note changes to focus grants on highest-performing and most critical roles to conserve shares. Key governance and dilution metrics and anti-dilution practices are disclosed, along with the intended use of shares for RSUs, PSUs, options, SARs, and cash-based awards. The Board recommends voting FOR, arguing the amendment balances talent needs and stockholder protection. The proposal could increase dilution and overhang; analysts and investors should weigh the one-year horizon, management’s burn-rate disclosures, and the company’s ability to constrain issuance to high-impact roles when evaluating whether to support the amendment.
A shareholder proposal by John Chevedden requesting an amendment to bylaws to allow holders of 10% of outstanding common stock (or lowest percentage as allowed by law) to call a special shareholder meeting.
This shareholder proposal, submitted by John Chevedden, requests that the company amend its governing documents to allow holders of 10% of outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage permitted by law) to call a special shareholder meeting, including virtual meetings. The proponent argues the right would provide a mechanism for shareholders to prompt board action when the company underperforms, citing stock price decline since 2021, analyst downgrades, product pricing complaints, potential competitive threats from AI, a technical service disruption, and reduced blog traffic as indicative of underperformance and governance risk. The Board opposes the proposal, recommending a vote against on grounds that a 10% threshold is too low and could empower a narrow group to disrupt governance; special meetings impose cost and operational burdens; and existing governance, shareholder engagement, and Delaware/NYSE safeguards already provide avenues for accountability. The Board also notes it will re-evaluate special meeting rights ahead of the 2027 proxy season. The conflict centers on balancing shareholder empowerment and responsiveness versus risk of minority-driven, disruptive actions, and the governance context (Board independence, annual election declassification, proxy access, stockholder engagement practices) is central to assessing the proposal’s merits. The proposal is non-binding if adopted, but passage would require the Board to amend governing documents to permit stockholders to call special meetings at the requested threshold.
Authorize adjournment of the Annual Meeting to a later date or dates to solicit additional proxies if there are insufficient votes to approve Proposals One through Four.
The Adjournment Proposal seeks shareholder approval to permit the meeting chair or proxies to adjourn the Annual Meeting to one or more later dates to allow additional solicitation of proxies if there are insufficient votes to approve Proposals One through Four at the time of the meeting. Management recommends approval because it is a routine procedural measure that preserves the company’s ability to solicit additional votes and avoid having to reconvene or cancel matters if key proposals do not receive necessary support. The measure is standard in proxy practices and typically has no substantive policy consequence beyond giving the company a mechanism to obtain sufficient votes when needed.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | PRICE T ROWE ASSOCIATES INC /MD/ | 8.89% | 4,552,187 | $1.1B |
| 2 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 5.59% | 2,861,445 | $698M |
| 3 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.44% | 2,271,588 | $554M |
| 4 | Pictet Asset Management Holding SA | 4.27% | 2,188,191 | $534M |
| 5 | JPMORGAN CHASE CO | 3.96% | 2,029,314 | $483M |
| 6 | AQR CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 3.12% | 1,595,661 | $390M |
| 7 | BlackRock, Inc. | 3.00% | 1,538,426 | $376M |
| 8 | FMR LLC | 2.75% | 1,408,629 | $344M |
| 9 | TWO SIGMA INVESTMENTS, LP | 2.63% | 1,344,621 | $328M |
| 10 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.59% | 1,329,088 | $324M |
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