Eastman Chemical Co
11 nominees · 5 ballot items.
Elect eleven directors; ratify PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as auditor; advisory approval of executive compensation (say-on-pay); approve the 2026 Omnibus Stock Compensation Plan; and consider a stockholder proposal to lower the special meeting-call threshold to 10% (board recommends against).
Follow how the vote landed and what changed on Eastman Chemical Co’s board — director track records, governance grades, and ongoing monitoring — on the Boardroom Alpha platform.
On the ballot5
- 1
Election of Directors
ManagementBoard: FORElect eleven directors to serve until the 2027 Annual Meeting.
- 2
Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
ManagementBoard: FORRatify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Eastman’s independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending December 31, 2026.
- 3
Advisory Approval of Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay
ManagementBoard: FORAdvisory (non-binding) vote to approve the compensation of the Company’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement.
More detail
This advisory 'say-on-pay' proposal asks stockholders to approve, on a non-binding basis, the compensation of Eastman’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis and compensation tables. Management seeks this advisory approval to validate its pay-for-performance approach, which emphasizes a significant portion of at-risk, performance-based pay (notably performance share awards, RSUs and options) designed to align executive incentives with long-term shareholder value, cash generation and strategic goals. The Compensation Committee describes adjustments for 2025 — heavier weighting on cash generation in annual incentives, a revised long-term incentive mix (PSAs, RSUs, options), and incorporation of strategic measures — to respond to market conditions and investor feedback. The committee engaged an independent consultant, used a peer group, instituted clawback policies and maintains robust governance (double-trigger change-in-control, no re-pricing). Management frames the program as retaining and motivating talent during cyclical industry conditions while containing risk through multi-year vesting and performance metrics (rTSR, ROIC, Adjusted EBIT/Modified OCF). The Board recommends a “FOR” vote, arguing these practices balance short- and long-term incentives and have delivered measured payouts in line with company performance. Key context includes 2025 performance (cash generation, adjusted EBIT) and prior engagement with investors; while the vote is non-binding, the Compensation Committee will consider results when setting compensation. For sophisticated evaluation: the plan’s mix, metric selection, and recent modifications aim to mitigate cyclical distortion but still leave room for scrutiny on metric calibration, peer selection, and realized pay versus long-term TSR outcomes; disclosure of realized vs. target outcomes and clawback mechanics will be important for assessing future alignment.
- 4
Approval of the 2026 Omnibus Stock Compensation Plan
ManagementBoard: FORApprove the 2026 Omnibus Stock Compensation Plan to replace the 2021 Plan and reserve shares for future equity awards.
More detail
This management proposal seeks stockholder approval of the 2026 Omnibus Stock Compensation Plan (the “2026 Plan”), which would replace the existing 2021 Plan when the new plan becomes effective. Management requests approval to reserve 7,500,000 new shares (plus certain unused shares from prior plans as described) to support equity awards over the next five years and to continue linking employee and director incentives with shareholder interests. The proposal explains the rationale — equity awards are critical for attraction, retention and alignment, and the Board and Compensation Committee considered dilution, burn rate, and overhang when setting the share reserve; they anticipate the requested shares will support awards at historical rates for approximately four years. The 2026 Plan includes typical governance safeguards: limits on individual awards, 1-year minimum vesting (with limited exceptions), 2.5x counting for full-value awards, no repricing without shareholder approval, and subplans for non-employee director awards with per-director value limits. The Board recommends a vote FOR, citing continuity of incentive programs, competitive positioning for talent, and plan provisions intended to limit dilution and preserve shareholder alignment. From an analytical perspective, key considerations for investors include the size of the share request relative to outstanding shares and historical burn rate (management disclosed ~0.80–0.86% burn rates and ~7.30% overhang as of 12/31/2025), the counting rules for full-value awards (2.5:1), individual award caps, and anti-dilution/adjustment provisions; governance protections and the board’s rationale reduce some concerns, but the exact longevity of the reserve depends on future grant practices and share price movements.
- 5
Advisory Vote on Stockholder Proposal Regarding Lowering the Threshold for Calling Special Shareholder Meetings to 10%
Shareholder — John CheveddenBoard: AGAINSTA stockholder proposal asking the Board to amend governing documents to allow holders of 10% of outstanding common stock to call a special shareholder meeting; the Board recommends against.
More detail
This shareholder proposal asks the Board to lower the ownership threshold required to call a special shareholder meeting from Eastman’s current 25% to 10%, arguing that a 10% threshold is common, would enable shareholders to address urgent matters between annual meetings, and that special meetings are rarely used and thus not destabilizing. The proponent (John Chevedden) presents operational and reputational incidents in 2025 — missed guidance, lowered outlook, rating agency outlook change, project delay, legal claims, regulatory fines and controversial exemptions — as context that could justify a lower threshold so shareholders can convene quickly if needed. Management and the Board recommend against the proposal, contending the current 25% threshold is already a meaningful minority right, aligns with leading practice, prevents a single activist from forcing meetings to advance narrow agendas, and avoids the substantial costs and distraction of special meetings; they also note robust engagement channels and that a similar proposal was previously rejected. Company disclosures show governance safeguards (majority voting, proxy access, independent committees) and quantitative metrics (FactSet comparators, prior vote history) supporting the Board’s position; they also disclose operational and financial context cited by the proponent. For governance analysis: lowering the threshold increases the probability of special meetings called by small groups or a single holder, potentially increasing short-term activism and costs, but also enhances shareholder ability to act on urgent governance or oversight failures. Evaluating this proposal requires weighing the tradeoff between responsiveness and protection from opportunistic convening, the company’s existing engagement effectiveness, the composition and accessibility of its investor base, and historical usage of special meeting rights at similarly situated firms.
Nominees on the ballot11
Top institutional holders10
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | BlackRock, Inc. | 10.6% | 12,085,070 | $922M |
| 2 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 6.7% | 7,628,354 | $582M |
| 3 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.5% | 5,108,718 | $390M |
| 4 | Capital Research Global Investors | 4.2% | 4,844,307 | $370M |
| 5 | DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS LP | 4.1% | 4,711,154 | $360M |
| 6 | STATE STREET CORP | 3.6% | 4,140,095 | $319M |
| 7 | FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC | 2.6% | 2,955,347 | $226M |
| 8 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.6% | 2,954,359 | $225M |
| 9 | Allspring Global Investments Holdings, LLC | 2.2% | 2,555,638 | $194M |
| 10 | EARNEST PARTNERS LLC | 2.1% | 2,446,234 | $187M |
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Frequently asked questions
- When is the Eastman Chemical Co 2026 annual meeting?
- Eastman Chemical Co (EMN) holds its 2026 annual shareholder meeting on Thursday, May 7, 2026.
- What is the record date for the Eastman Chemical Co 2026 meeting?
- The record date for the Eastman Chemical Co 2026 meeting is Monday, March 16, 2026. Shareholders of record on or before that date are eligible to vote.
- Who are the director nominees for Eastman Chemical Co's 2026 meeting?
- The board is presenting 11 director nominees at the Eastman Chemical Co 2026 meeting, listed with their independence status and background.
- What proposals will shareholders vote on at the Eastman Chemical Co 2026 meeting?
- Shareholders will vote on 5 proposals at the Eastman Chemical Co 2026 meeting, each tagged with who proposed it and the board's recommendation.
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