10 nominees · 5 ballot items.
Elect ten directors; Ratify PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent auditors for 2026; Advisory (non-binding) vote to approve executive compensation; Stockholder proposal to remove DEI from Board candidate considerations; Stockholder proposal to require an independent Board Chairman.
Elect the ten director nominees named in the Proxy Statement to hold office until the next annual meeting.
Ratify the Audit Committee’s selection of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm for 2026.
Non-binding, advisory “say-on-pay” vote to approve the compensation of the named executive officers as disclosed in the Proxy Statement (CD&A, tables and narrative).
This proposal asks shareholders to cast a non-binding advisory vote to approve the Company’s executive compensation disclosures and the compensation decisions made for the named executive officers during the most recent fiscal year. Management is seeking shareholder endorsement of its pay programs — which emphasize a high degree of variable, performance-based compensation (annual incentives, PBRSUs, options and RSUs) designed to align executive incentives with organic sales growth, Base Business Earnings Per Share, free cash flow productivity and relative performance versus a Comparison Group — to validate its approach and provide a mandate for continuing the current compensation framework. The vote is advisory and not binding, but the Board and the Personnel & Organization Committee will consider the outcome when setting future compensation and governance practices; the Company also highlights that the prior advisory vote received substantial support (91.4% in 2025), which management cites as evidence of stockholder approval of its approach. The proxy explains specific features intended to protect shareholders (clawback policies, stock ownership guidelines, limits on hedging/pledging, no tax gross-ups, double-trigger change-in-control vesting) and details how annual and long-term incentive metrics were set, adjusted (e.g., tariff-related EPS adjustment) and paid, providing context for the recommendation. From a governance perspective, the Board argues the mix of metrics and relative peer measures (including a TSR modifier) tie pay to multi-year outcomes and shareholder returns, while also noting robust independent consultant support and committee oversight in program design. Risks to investors include the potential for discretion (the P&O Committee retains adjustment authority and exercised it for tariff effects) and the complexity of multi-component plans that may obscure single-driver impacts, but these are offset by the Committee’s governance practices and disclosure. Given the Company’s stated pay-for-performance orientation, strong stockholder engagement and the Board’s rationale, a vote FOR would support continuity of the current compensation framework; a vote AGAINST would signal stockholder dissatisfaction with pay outcomes or governance and likely prompt enhanced outreach and potential program changes.
Request that the Board adopt a policy eliminating consideration of race, ethnicity, gender and other DEI-correlated characteristics in the Company’s Board candidate selection process, to the extent consistent with law.
The shareholder proponent (National Legal and Policy Center) requests that the Board eliminate consideration of DEI characteristics—race, ethnicity, gender and similar attributes—from the Board candidate selection process, arguing such factors are undefined by Title VII and risk unlawful disparate treatment, and citing recent court activity striking down Nasdaq’s diversity disclosure rule as a legal and evidentiary caution. The proponent frames the issue as one of legal compliance and merit-based selection, contending that identity-based criteria are unrelated to fiduciary duties and should be excluded from the NGCR Committee’s selection criteria. Management counters that for a global consumer company serving diverse markets, diversity of background and perspective—including demographic facets—contribute materially to strategy, product development and market understanding, and that the NGCR Committee’s Independent Board Candidate Qualifications appropriately balance qualifications and diverse perspectives. The Board also emphasizes governance protections—annual director elections, proxy access, majority vote standard—and contends the proposal would improperly constrain the committee’s judgment and flexibility in composing an effective board. The shareholder case raises legitimate legal and normative questions about how firms define and implement “DEI,” while the company’s rebuttal highlights practical business rationales and governance safeguards; the dispute therefore centers on the proper role of demographic factors in director selection and on whether a categorical ban would be lawful or desirable. From an investor stewardship perspective, a vote FOR the proposal would press the Company to revise its nomination criteria and could spark further governance changes and legal scrutiny; a vote AGAINST supports the Board’s current, broader nomination framework and its argument that diversity—as the Company defines it—advances business oversight and shareholder value.
Request that the Board adopt a policy to separate the roles of Chairman and CEO and require the Chairman be an independent director (with limited interim exceptions).
The proponent (John Chevedden) asks the Company to adopt a policy separating the roles of Chairman and CEO so the Board Chair is an independent director, arguing this would strengthen oversight, reduce conflicts and increase accountability—citing recent weak sales guidance, tariff impacts and other adverse press as contextual justification. Management responds that the Board already provides strong independent oversight via an empowered independent Lead Director, all-independent committees, annual director elections and other governance mechanisms, and that combining the Chairman and CEO roles provides a useful bridge to management in the current operating environment. The debate reflects a classic governance tradeoff: proponents argue separation improves checks-and-balances and investor confidence, while management contends unified leadership can improve strategic execution and communications between the board and management; Colgate’s specific facts (a board with 9 of 10 nominees independent, an active Lead Director, and committee structures) make the company’s case for flexibility credible. For investors, key considerations include board responsiveness to performance issues, the effectiveness and authority of the Lead Director, and how separation might affect CEO accountability and strategic continuity. A vote FOR would push Colgate toward a structural governance change aligned with some investor governance norms; a vote AGAINST preserves management’s current leadership structure while signaling support for the Board’s judgment about optimal leadership given its global and strategic context.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 6.53% | 52,219,824 | $4.5B |
| 2 | STATE STREET CORP | 5.96% | 47,719,482 | $4.1B |
| 3 | PRICE T ROWE ASSOCIATES INC /MD/ | 4.07% | 32,570,001 | $2.8B |
| 4 | BlackRock, Inc. | 3.35% | 26,782,424 | $2.3B |
| 5 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 2.98% | 23,822,746 | $2.0B |
| 6 | GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 2.54% | 20,305,959 | $1.7B |
| 7 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.14% | 17,140,294 | $1.5B |
| 8 | MORGAN STANLEY | 1.42% | 11,328,101 | $965M |
| 9 | DEUTSCHE BANK AG\ | 1.15% | 9,200,786 | $784M |
| 10 | First Eagle Investment Management, LLC | 1.00% | 7,966,449 | $679M |
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