Boardroom Alpha
Meeting calendar
CBRE · Annual meeting · Thursday, May 21, 2026

Cbre Group Inc

10 nominees · 4 ballot items.

Elect 10 directors; ratify KPMG LLP as independent auditor for 2026; advisory “say-on-pay” vote to approve 2025 named executive officer compensation; and consider (if properly presented) a shareholder proposal by John Chevedden to lower the threshold to call special shareholder meetings to 10% (Board recommends against).

Market cap
$42.1B
1Y TSR
-4.8%
Board grade
B
Record date
Mar 23, 2026
Filing
DEF 14A
Meeting concluded · May 21, 2026

Follow how the vote landed and what changed on Cbre Group Inc’s board — director track records, governance grades, and ongoing monitoring — on the Boardroom Alpha platform.

Proposals

On the ballot4

  1. 1

    Elect Directors

    ManagementBoard: FOR

    Election of the 10 Board‑nominated director nominees to hold office until the next annual meeting and the election of their successors.

  2. 2

    Ratify the Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

    ManagementBoard: FOR

    Ratification of the Audit Committee’s appointment of KPMG LLP as the company’s independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2026.

  3. 3

    Advisory Vote to Approve Named Executive Officer Compensation (Say on Pay

    ManagementBoard: FOR

    An advisory (non‑binding) vote to approve the compensation of the named executive officers as disclosed for fiscal year 2025.

    More detail

    This management proposal asks shareholders to cast a non‑binding advisory vote to approve the company’s 2025 named executive officer (NEO) compensation as disclosed in the proxy materials. Management’s stated rationale is that the compensation program is pay‑for‑performance oriented—paying a significant portion of NEO compensation in performance‑based equity and annual incentives linked to Core EBITDA, Core EPS and strategic objectives—to align executives’ interests with long‑term stockholder value and to retain top talent. The Compensation Committee highlights robust governance: independent committee oversight, independent consultant advice, stock ownership guidelines, clawback policies, and limits on hedging/pledging, and reports strong prior shareholder support (≈91.4% in 2025). Contextually, 2025 operational performance (revenue growth, Core EBITDA and Core EPS gains, strategic acquisitions and share repurchases) produced above‑target payouts and increased equity awards tied to multi‑year metrics, which management uses to justify the pay outcomes. Opponents may argue that large equity grants and supplemental awards can concentrate power, potentially create outsized realized pay in strong TSR years, and that advisory approval should be a check on pay practices; however, management asserts it actively engaged with investors and revised equity mix to emphasize performance metrics in response to feedback. The vote is advisory and will not bind the Board, but the Compensation Committee will consider results when setting future pay. For an analyst, the relevant considerations are: the explicit link of pay to Core EPS and relative TSR metrics, the shift toward two‑thirds performance‑based long‑term awards, the company’s recent financial outperformance, and strong historical shareholder support—factors that generally favor a positive recommendation while still leaving room for active shareholder engagement on pay details going forward.

  4. 4

    Stockholder Proposal Regarding Stockholders' Ability to Call Special Stockholder Meetings

    Shareholder — John CheveddenBoard: AGAINST

    A shareholder proposal from John Chevedden requesting that the company amend its governing documents to allow holders of 10% of outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage permitted by law) to call a special shareholder meeting, remove unnecessary holding‑period or record‑holder requirements, and publish the bylaw on the company website.

    More detail

    The shareholder proponent (John Chevedden) asks the company to amend its governing documents so stockholders holding a combined 10% of outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law) may call a special shareholder meeting, to eliminate any unnecessary holding‑period or record‑holder requirements, and to publish the bylaw online. Chevedden’s core argument is that the company’s existing 25% threshold is prohibitively high and effectively renders the right to call special meetings unusable, reducing shareholder recourse and director accountability; he cites 2025 operational headwinds (macro uncertainty, REI weakness, and valuation concerns) to justify greater stockholder responsiveness. Management counters that the company’s bylaws already permit special meetings and that shareholders have repeatedly voted to retain a higher threshold (30% in 2016, 25% in later votes), arguing the 25% standard balances the need to deter opportunistic or costly special meetings while preserving meaningful rights. The Board further contends a 10% threshold would be well below many S&P 500 peers, risk enabling small groups to call meetings for narrow agendas, and would impose substantial operational costs; it highlights ongoing investor engagement channels as alternatives. For analysts, key considerations include the company’s prior shareholder votes on this exact subject (consistent rejection of 10%), the governance tradeoff between enabling activist intervention and protecting against frivolous meetings, the company’s ownership structure and likelihood that a 10% group could mobilize, and precedent in peer companies. The governance impact of lowering the threshold depends on stockholder concentration and coordination costs—if ownership is highly dispersed a 10% threshold meaningfully increases shareholder power; if ownership is concentrated among long‑term holders the practical impact may be limited. Evaluators should weigh the Board’s demonstrated responsiveness to investor feedback (e.g., engagement and compensation changes) against the proponent’s objective of strengthening a shareholder check in periods of strategic stress.

Director elections

Nominees on the ballot10

Independent
Tenure on this board
7.7 yrs
Also a director at
First American Financial Corp (FAF)Realty Income Corp (O)Orion Properties Inc (ONL)
Independent
Tenure on this board
7.2 yrs
Also a director at
Burlington Stores Inc (BURL)
Independent
Tenure on this board
10.8 yrs
Also a director at
Newell Brands Inc (NWL)Realty Income Corp (O)Mgp Ingredients Inc (MGPI)
Independent
Tenure on this board
2.4 yrs
Also a director at
Prologis Inc (PLD)
Ownership

Top institutional holders10

Latest 13F quarter
1VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC8.8%25,807,550$3.5B
2VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC6.5%19,051,019$2.6B
3STATE STREET CORP4.8%14,016,479$1.9B
4BlackRock, Inc.3.9%11,439,731$1.5B
5PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC3.2%9,408,883$1.3B
6GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC2.6%7,678,314$1.0B
7HARRIS ASSOCIATES L P2.1%6,285,046$851M
8BlackRock, Inc.2.1%6,045,653$819M
9MILLENNIUM MANAGEMENT LLC1.5%4,294,149$582M
10Artisan Partners Limited Partnership1.4%3,957,996$536M
Filings

Recent key filings

Periodic reports
Definitive proxies
Reference

Frequently asked questions

When is the Cbre Group Inc 2026 annual meeting?
Cbre Group Inc (CBRE) holds its 2026 annual shareholder meeting on Thursday, May 21, 2026.
What is the record date for the Cbre Group Inc 2026 meeting?
The record date for the Cbre Group Inc 2026 meeting is Monday, March 23, 2026. Shareholders of record on or before that date are eligible to vote.
Who are the director nominees for Cbre Group Inc's 2026 meeting?
The board is presenting 10 director nominees at the Cbre Group Inc 2026 meeting, listed with their independence status and background.
What proposals will shareholders vote on at the Cbre Group Inc 2026 meeting?
Shareholders will vote on 4 proposals at the Cbre Group Inc 2026 meeting, each tagged with who proposed it and the board's recommendation.
Disclaimer

The opinions and information contained herein have been obtained or derived from sources believed to be reliable, but Boardroom Alpha cannot guarantee its accuracy and completeness, and that of the opinions based thereon.

This report contains opinions and is provided for informational purposes only – it does not constitute investment, legal or tax advice. You should not rely solely upon the research herein for purposes of transacting securities or other investments, and you are encouraged to conduct your own research and due diligence, and to seek the advice of a qualified securities professional before you make any investment.

None of the information contained in this report constitutes, or is intended to constitute a recommendation by Boardroom Alpha of any particular security or trading strategy or a determination by Boardroom Alpha that any security or trading strategy is suitable for any specific person. To the extent any of the information contained herein may be deemed to be investment advice, such information is impersonal and not tailored to the investment needs of any specific person.

No representation or warranty, expressed or implied, is made on behalf of Boardroom Alpha as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein. Boardroom Alpha does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage suffered by any person as a result of relying on all or any part of this research and any liability is expressly disclaimed.

Full disclaimer