Boston Scientific Corp
10 nominees · 8 ballot items.
Elect ten directors; advisory vote to approve named executive officers’ compensation; ratify Ernst & Young LLP as independent auditor; amend Employee Stock Purchase Plan to add 10,000,000 shares; amend Certificate of Incorporation to remove supermajority voting provisions; amend Certificate of Incorporation to provide officer exculpation as permitted by Delaware law; amend Certificate of Incorporation and By‑Laws to permit stockholders holding 25% to call special meetings; stockholder proposal to allow shareholders holding 10% to call special meetings (advisory).
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On the ballot8
- 1
Election of Directors
ManagementBoard: FORElect ten nominees to the Board of Directors for one‑year terms.
- 2
Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation of our Named Executive Officers
ManagementBoard: FORNon‑binding, advisory approval of the compensation paid to named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy.
More detail
The proposal asks shareholders to approve, on a non‑binding advisory basis, the compensation of the company’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement, including the Compensation Discussion & Analysis and compensation tables. Management seeks endorsement to validate its pay‑for‑performance approach which ties a significant portion of executive pay to short‑term and long‑term performance metrics (Adjusted Net Sales, Adjusted EPS, Adjusted Operating Income Margin, ONSG, rTSR), and to demonstrate shareholder support for its compensation policies and governance practices. The Compensation Committee uses an independent consultant, peer benchmarking, and internal pay equity in setting pay, and has features such as clawbacks, stock ownership guidelines, and double‑trigger change‑in‑control protections. The board recommends a “FOR” vote because it believes the program aligns executives’ interests with long‑term stockholder value, emphasizes performance‑based and at‑risk pay, and incorporates best practices (no repricing without approval, no hedging or pledging, limited tax gross‑ups). A “FOR” vote supports continued implementation of current incentive structures; a vote against would signal shareholder concern about executive pay levels, metrics or governance and could prompt the Committee to review program design and disclosures.
- 3
Ratify the Appointment of Ernst & Young LLP
ManagementBoard: FORRatify Ernst & Young LLP as the company’s independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2026.
- 4
Amend Employee Stock Purchase Plan to Increase Shares Reserved for Issuance
ManagementBoard: FORApprove amendment to the ESPP to increase shares reserved from 60,000,000 to 70,000,000 shares and authorize Compensation Committee amendments and housekeeping revisions.
More detail
This management proposal requests shareholder approval to amend the Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP) to increase the share reserve by 10 million shares, from 60 million to 70 million shares, to ensure continued employee participation and retention through broad‑based stock ownership. Management is seeking approval because the ESPP reserve established in 2022 is nearly exhausted as a result of strong employee uptake; increasing the share pool requires stockholder authorization. The proposed amendment also expressly authorizes the Compensation Committee to make administrative amendments and adopts routine housekeeping changes and non‑U.S. sub‑plans to facilitate global participation and compliance. The board recommends a “FOR” vote on the grounds that the ESPP aligns employee and shareholder interests, aids retention and recruitment, and supports long‑term value creation. Key considerations for investors are dilution (the proposal increases the available shares by roughly 10 million) versus the benefits of employee ownership, the ESPP discount mechanics (typically 85% of market at specified dates), and the prevalence of an ESPP among peers. The proposal is routine and transaction‑neutral — it does not change discount limits or other economically significant plan rules — and the board believes the uplift in employee alignment and retention justifies the modest increase in authorized shares.
- 5
Amend Certificate of Incorporation to Remove Supermajority Voting Provisions
ManagementBoard: FORApprove amendment and restatement of Certificate of Incorporation to eliminate supermajority voting provisions and certain inoperative or clarifying changes.
More detail
This management proposal seeks shareholder approval to amend the company’s Certificate of Incorporation to eliminate several existing supermajority voting provisions — specifically 80%‑vote thresholds — that currently apply to amendments of certain by‑law and charter provisions (e.g., special meeting restrictions, nomination processes, director removal and other governance rules). Management pursued this change following a prior non‑binding stockholder vote and engagement showing clear stockholder preference for removing supermajority requirements. The practical effect of the amendment would be to convert high‑threshold governance changes into majority‑vote matters, thereby making it procedurally easier for stockholders and the Board to amend the charter/by‑laws in the future. Management frames the change as alignment with modern governance norms and stockholder expectations, reducing entrenchment risk and enhancing accountability. Investors should weigh the benefits of increased governance flexibility and stockholder empowerment against concerns that lowering amendment thresholds could permit more frequent governance changes or enable transient majorities to alter protections; the Board has indicated other guardrails remain in place (majority voting standards, proxy access, etc.). The board recommends a “FOR” vote to implement the change.
- 6
Amend Certificate of Incorporation to Provide for Exculpation of Certain Officers
ManagementBoard: FORApprove amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to exculpate certain corporate officers from monetary liability to the fullest extent permitted by Delaware law (Section 102(b)(7)).
More detail
This management proposal requests shareholder approval to amend the Certificate of Incorporation to extend the corporation’s existing exculpation (which currently applies to directors) to certain officers to the fullest extent permitted by Delaware law (Section 102(b)(7)). The proposed language would permit limitations on monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care by designated officers but would not shield officers for breaches of the duty of loyalty, bad‑faith conduct, knowing violations of law, or transactions in which the officer derived an improper personal benefit; the amendment also would not apply retroactively to acts or omissions prior to its effective date. Management argues the change promotes strong governance and helps recruit and retain senior talent by aligning officer protections with those already afforded to directors and reducing the risk of baseless direct claims against officers. Investors should consider the tradeoff between recruiting/retention and potential reduction in officer accountability. The board recommends a “FOR” vote.
- 7
Amend Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws to Permit Stockholders Holding 25% of our Common Stock to Call a Special Meeting
ManagementBoard: FORApprove amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws to permit stockholders owning at least 25% of outstanding common stock continuously for one year to request a special meeting, subject to procedural requirements and exclusions.
More detail
Proposal 7 would add a stockholder right to request a special stockholder meeting if the requester (or group up to 20) has continuously Owned at least 25% of the company’s outstanding common stock for one year, and meets procedural, notice and information requirements in the proposed By-Law amendments. Management is seeking shareholder approval to grant this right because it believes a 25% threshold with a one‑year holding requirement strikes an appropriate balance between stockholder empowerment and protection from tactical or minorities’ disruptive use of special meetings. The proposed rules require stockholders who request a special meeting to provide extensive disclosures and do not permit requests for matters that are not proper for stockholder action, that are substantially duplicative, or that fall in blackout windows tied to the annual meeting cycle. The Board points to market practice data showing 25% is the most common threshold among S&P 500 companies that allow stockholders to request special meetings and says it adopted the proposal after engagement and as an alternative to the proponent's 10% request (Proposal 8). For a sophisticated assessment: the change materially strengthens formal stockholder engagement rights (allowing an expedited forum for urgent governance or strategy matters) while guarding against opportunistic meeting calls via the high ownership bar, one‑year holding requirement and procedural hurdles. Investors should weigh the enhanced ability to call urgent meetings against the fact that only large, long‑term holders will be able to utilize the right; furthermore, the Board retains substantial discretion to refuse requests that fail procedural tests, placing importance on the specifics of the By‑Law implementation. The board recommends a “FOR” vote.
- 8
Stockholder Proposal titled “Give Shareholders the Ability to Call for a Special Shareholder Meeting”
Shareholder — John CheveddenBoard: AGAINSTStockholder‑led proposal requesting amendment to give holders of 10% of common stock the power to call a special shareholder meeting without a minimum holding period or poison‑pill restrictions.
More detail
This shareholder proposal, submitted by John Chevedden, asks the company to amend its governing documents to allow holders of 10% of outstanding shares to call a special shareholder meeting without a holding‑period requirement and explicitly forbids governance terms (a “poison pill discriminatory rule”) that would limit participation. The proponent argues a 10% threshold is standard at many companies, that special meetings are rarely used, and online meetings make them inexpensive. Management opposes this request, recommending against it because it believes a 10% threshold is too low and could enable small but active activists to impose disruptive special meetings; instead the board proposes Proposal 7 to grant special meeting rights at a 25% threshold coupled with a one‑year holding requirement and procedural hurdles that aim to protect against opportunistic calls. For a sophisticated evaluation: the proponent’s plan would materially lower the ownership threshold needed to force an expedited forum for critical governance or strategic matters, empowering substantial but smaller stockholder coalitions and potentially increasing accountability and responsiveness. However, it raises governance risk of tactical or transient majorities pressuring management and the Board, and could invite more frequent litigation or transaction‑driven activism; the company’s counterproposal (25% + one‑year) seeks a middle ground favoring only large, long‑term holders. Investors should weigh enforcement and procedural details (e.g., disclosure, revocation on share disposals, blackout periods), the company’s responsiveness via management’s Proposal 7, and whether 10% better serves or undermines long‑term shareholder value. The Board recommends voting “AGAINST” the Proponent’s 10% request and instead supports Proposal 7.
Nominees on the ballot10
Top institutional holders10
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 6.5% | 96,411,568 | $6.0B |
| 2 | STATE STREET CORP | 4.6% | 67,986,847 | $4.3B |
| 3 | FMR LLC | 3.4% | 50,229,573 | $3.2B |
| 4 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.9% | 43,389,490 | $2.7B |
| 5 | PRIMECAP MANAGEMENT CO/CA/ | 2.2% | 32,529,774 | $2.0B |
| 6 | BlackRock, Inc. | 2.2% | 32,046,403 | $2.0B |
| 7 | VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 2.0% | 29,796,211 | $1.9B |
| 8 | GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 1.9% | 28,532,256 | $1.8B |
| 9 | D. E. Shaw Co., Inc.Activist | 1.4% | 20,369,922 | $1.3B |
| 10 | JPMORGAN CHASE CO | 1.3% | 19,068,778 | $1.2B |
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Frequently asked questions
- When is the Boston Scientific Corp 2026 annual meeting?
- Boston Scientific Corp (BSX) holds its 2026 annual shareholder meeting on Thursday, April 30, 2026.
- What is the record date for the Boston Scientific Corp 2026 meeting?
- The record date for the Boston Scientific Corp 2026 meeting is Friday, March 6, 2026. Shareholders of record on or before that date are eligible to vote.
- Who are the director nominees for Boston Scientific Corp's 2026 meeting?
- The board is presenting 10 director nominees at the Boston Scientific Corp 2026 meeting, listed with their independence status and background.
- What proposals will shareholders vote on at the Boston Scientific Corp 2026 meeting?
- Shareholders will vote on 8 proposals at the Boston Scientific Corp 2026 meeting, each tagged with who proposed it and the board's recommendation.
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