5 nominees · 6 ballot items.
Six proposals: election of five directors; ratification of Grant Thornton LLP as independent auditors; amendment to increase authorized common shares from 75,000,000 to 82,000,000; amendment to increase the 2019 Stock Incentive Plan by 2,000,000 shares; approval to implement a reverse stock split of common stock at a ratio between 1-for-20 and 1-for-25; and a non-binding advisory vote to approve named executive officer compensation.
Elect five directors (Mark D. Gordon, Mark B. Justh, Larissa T. Pommeraud, Jon D. Sawyer, and Todd E. Siegel) to serve until the next Annual Meeting and until their successors are elected and qualified.
Ratify the appointment of Grant Thornton LLP as the Company’s independent registered certified public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2026.
Amend the Articles of Incorporation to increase authorized common stock from 75,000,000 to up to 82,000,000 shares.
This proposal asks shareholders to approve an amendment to the Company’s Articles of Incorporation to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock from 75,000,000 to up to 82,000,000. Management and the Board argue the increase provides the company with necessary flexibility to execute business and financing strategies—such as equity or equity-linked offerings, strategic transactions, stock-based compensation and other corporate purposes—without the delay of seeking shareholder approval for each issuance. Approval would permit the Board to issue additional shares subject to applicable law and listing rules, which could dilute existing holders and reduce their percentage ownership if and when shares are issued. The Board notes that without the increase the Company may be constrained in its ability to raise capital in a timely manner, potentially limiting operational or strategic opportunities or the Company’s ability to consummate planned transactions. Although the board disclaims any immediate intent to use the additional shares for anti-takeover purposes, it acknowledges that broader authorized share capacity can be used in ways that may make hostile takeovers more difficult. The proposal requires a majority of voting power to pass, and abstentions/broker non-votes will count as votes against. In evaluating the merits, an analyst should weigh the company's near-term capital needs (including the recently announced merger and related financing considerations), current share-count and outstanding dilution, the board’s governance protections, and the trade-off between flexibility for financing versus the dilutive impact on existing shareholders. Given Odyssey’s stated need for capital and potential transaction activity tied to its merger pathway, the Board presents this amendment as a prudent precaution to preserve optionality for corporate actions that could support execution and liquidity.
Amend the 2019 Stock Incentive Plan to add 2,000,000 shares to the plan’s authorized share reserve.
This proposal requests shareholder approval to increase the 2019 Stock Incentive Plan share reserve by 2,000,000 shares. Management contends the current available reserve (199,906 shares as of February 20, 2026) is insufficient to meet forecasted grant needs for new hires, director compensation and retention awards, and that the additional shares—representing roughly 3.6% of outstanding shares based on the filing date—will provide sufficiency for approximately two years of award activity under current assumptions. The 2019 Plan includes governance safeguards (no evergreen provision, prohibition on liberal recycling, no repricing without shareholder approval, and double-trigger change-in-control acceleration) intended to mitigate shareholder concerns about unlimited dilution or poor governance practices. Grant activity, historical burn rate, outstanding awards and the company’s need to incentivize management through equity given limited cash resources are relevant contextual factors. If approved, the amendment will increase potential dilution and overhang; the company quantifies the potential overhang at about 8.4% using February 20, 2026 data. Investors should balance the dilution against the benefits of retaining and motivating personnel who can execute value-creating projects—particularly given the company’s strategic initiatives and merger progress—and consider whether historical grant practices and board governance protections align with shareholder interests. The Board’s recommendation emphasizes alignment of executive and employee incentives with long-term shareholder value, but sophisticated investors should monitor future grant sizing, tenure, and the Compensation Committee’s use of the expanded reserve to limit unnecessary dilution.
Approve a reverse stock split of outstanding common stock at a ratio between 1-for-20 and 1-for-25, with the Board authorized to choose the exact ratio and timing.
Proposal 5 asks shareholders to authorize a Board-discretion reverse stock split in the 1-for-20 to 1-for-25 range and to permit the Board to determine the precise ratio and timing if the measure is approved. Management and the Board cite multiple objectives: to increase the per-share trading price to broaden institutional interest and meet internal broker/investor thresholds, to reduce per-dollar transaction costs for retail investors, and critically to comply with a reverse-split covenant in the Merger Agreement that is tied to financing commitments for the proposed merger with AOM. The Board would retain the ability not to implement the split even if authorized, and would carry out the split only if it believes the market and corporate circumstances warrant it. The reverse split will reduce outstanding shares proportionally, not change authorized share counts (unless Proposal 3 also passes), and will result in cash payments in lieu of fractional shares based on the closing Nasdaq price at effectiveness. Risks include possible reduced liquidity and increased odd-lot holdings, the potential for the post-split price not to rise proportionally (or to fall), and perception effects where reverse splits can signal weakness or desperation; these factors could magnify price volatility. The split is also material to the merger financing: failure to approve could force the Board to effect a similar split by resolution (requiring a proportional reduction in authorized capital) or complicate the merger financing. Analysts evaluating this proposal should weigh the immediate financing and listing compliance considerations tied to the merger against the medium-term liquidity and market-perception trade-offs, and consider alternatives such as other financing routes that do not require a split.
Non-binding advisory vote to approve the compensation of the Company’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy statement.
This non-binding 'say-on-pay' proposal asks stockholders to vote to approve the Company’s disclosed 2025 executive compensation for named executive officers. The Compensation Committee emphasizes a pay-for-performance philosophy, with a significant portion of total compensation tied to long-term equity awards and an annual incentive plan linked to corporate performance metrics including debt conversion, capital availability, portfolio value enhancements and operational objectives. The advisory vote is intended to provide the Board and Compensation Committee with shareholder feedback; it is not binding but will be considered when setting future compensation. The Board recommends an annual frequency for say-on-pay votes and intends to use the results to guide compensation decisions and program design. Key factors for an analyst are the structure and outcomes of 2025 incentives (e.g., target and achieved payouts, the use of long-term equity to conserve cash, and clawback policy), the degree to which realized pay aligns with long-term shareholder returns and company milestones, and whether governance safeguards (independent Compensation Committee, public disclosure, and double-trigger vesting) adequately protect shareholder interests. Given the company’s turnaround and transaction-oriented activities, shareholders should assess whether the incentives properly balance near-term operational goals and long-term value creation, and whether disclosure and metrics provide sufficient transparency to judge pay-for-performance alignment.
| # | Owner | % of shares | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Two Seas Capital LP | 9.5% | 5,592,985 | $5M |
| 2 | Old West Investment Management, LLC | 8.1% | 4,773,196 | $4M |
| 3 | VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.1% | 2,396,641 | $2M |
| 4 | Jefferies Financial Group Inc. | 2.6% | 1,500,000 | $1M |
| 5 | CITADEL ADVISORS LLC | 2.5% | 1,493,547 | $1M |
| 6 | SUSQUEHANNA INTERNATIONAL GROUP, LLP | 1.4% | 828,577 | $691K |
| 7 | RENAISSANCE TECHNOLOGIES LLC | 0.9% | 541,721 | $452K |
| 8 | GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 0.8% | 492,039 | $411K |
| 9 | UBS Group AG | 0.6% | 361,821 | $302K |
| 10 | VANGUARD FIDUCIARY TRUST CO | 0.5% | 266,559 | $222K |
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